Epistemic Injustice: Power And The Ethics Of Knowing Miranda Fricker Oxford University Press Αγγλικά Βιβλία Social Sciences Philosophy

Epistemic Injustice Explores The Idea That There Is A Distinctively Kind Of - Which Consists In Wrong Done To Someone Specifically Their Capacity As Knower Miranda Fricker Distinguishes Two Forms Injustice: Testimonial And Hermeneutical Occurs When Prejudice Causes Hearer Give Deflated Level Credibility Speaker\ S Word Case Where Police Do Not Believe Because He Black By Contrast Gap Collective Interpretative Resources Puts At An Unfair Disadvantage It Comes Making Sense Social Experiences Central This Sort Found Example Woman Who Suffers Sexual Harassment Prior Time We Acquired Critical Concept So She Cannot Properly Comprehend Her Own Experience Let Alone Render Communicatively Intelligible Others Connection With Each These Develops Our Sensibility Needs Incorporate Corrective Anti-Prejudicial Virtue Can Be Used Promote More Veridical Democratic Practice Epistemology Has Traditionally Been Pursued Impoverished Lack Any Theoretical Framework Conducive Revealing Ethical Political Aspects Conduct Shows Provides General Epistemological Idiom Issues Fruitfully Forcefully Discussed Σελίδες: 208 Διαστάσεις: 13 9X13 9Cm